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ABSTRACT
The impact of corporate governance on firm value has been extensively debated by academics and
business practitioners. Some studies show that companies that allow minority shareholders to have more
control are likely to create greater shareholder value than those firms with concentrated control, while
other studies suggest that the impact of having democratic governance is either negligible or even
negative. In developed countries institutional investors have a significant stake in most of the companies.
Active engagement by institutional investors is expected to decrease agency costs by strengthening
monitoring mechanisms of operations and performance evaluations of the management, resulting in an
increase in firm value. However, some academics and business practitioners argue that such minority
shareholders' active engagement could be detrimental to firm value. In this thesis, I study the influence of
institutional investors' active shareholder engagement on firm value and the relationship between the
characteristics of corporate governance and firm value of target companies. I review previous studies that
have evaluated both the effect of corporate governance and of institutional investors' activism on firm
value. I conduct empirical analyses to examine the relationship between the institutions' shareholder
engagement and firm value.
Thesis Supervisor: David McLean
Title: Visiting Associate Professor of Finance
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Chapter I: Introduction
A. Introduction
Currently, institutional investors constitute a significant proportion of ownership in corporations
in developed countries. Theodore Augehs (1998) states that with 2 to 3% of ownership, an active investor
can exercise significant influence over an organization.
It has been argued by some academics that minority investors' engagement increases firm value,
since minority shareholders' involvement can reduce costs associated with the agency problem (Agency
cost). They point out that corporate governance is the mechanism that allows minority shareholders to
exercise their influence over the firm's operation. They say that a firm with characteristics of corporate
governance that allows minority shareholders to have more control is likely to create more firm value than
other firms.
However, other prior studies suggest different views about the relationship between the
characteristics of corporate governance and firm value. Some say that institutional investors' active
engagement effort strengthens monitoring of firm operation and hence disciplines the management. On
the other hand, others claim that active shareholder engagement by institutional investors is either
detrimental to firm value or has only negligible impact.
This debate comes down to two questions: what type of corporate governance allows firms to
maximize firm value? Can institutional investors' active exercise of voting rights lead to an increase in
firm value by affecting corporate governance of these companies?
B. Corporate Governance on Firm Value
Different studies provide alternate conclusions regarding the influence of corporate governance
on firm value. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) state that companies with democratic corporate
governance are likely to have greater firm value, while Gillian and Starks (2000) say that such a
correlation is negligible. I review previous studies on corporate governance to assess the underlying ideas
behind these arguments and summarize their empirical findings.
C. The Influence of Institutional Investors on Firm Value
There has also been disagreement on the issue of the influence of institutional investors on firm
value. According to Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2010), institutional ownership positively affects
the functioning of target corporations, resulting in the improvement of corporate governance. However,
Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996) say that there is no conclusive evidence that supports such a
positive correlation between the two.
D. Empirical Study
I explore these questions empirically. Most prior empirical studies tend to focus on US
corporations. I analyze the relationships globally using Thomson Reuter's ASSET4 database that provides
the Corporate Governance Scores of 4,109 listed companies in almost 60 countries. (US firms 25~30%,
Non-US firms 75-70%)
9
I examine the relationship between the institutional ownership and corporate governance through
regression analyses. My study also includes multivariate analyses on the influence of corporate
governance on firm value.
My empirical tests suggest the following: there is a positive and significant relationship between
institutional investor ownership and high Corporate Governance Score. Also, there is positive and
significant correlation between the Corporate Governance Score and firm value.
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Chapter II: Review of Previous Research
A. Corporate Governance
1. Separation of Ownership and Control
Governance stems from the Greek verb Kofepvdw, a term that means to steer. This term has been
interpreted as sets of activities that define the directions and establish the objectives. Management is
derived from the Italian verb maneggiare. Management is a process to select the means to proceed in the
direction and to achieve the goals using the resources available within an organization.
In the past, owners of corporations ran their organization by themselves. However, the increasing
demands for specialization in management and risk taking have led firms to separate ownership and
control. As a result, in majority of the listed corporations in developed countries ownership and control
are separate. Instead of owners, managers, including chief executive officers, exercise direct control over
the day to day operations.
This separation of ownership and management leads to dispersion of ownership. It has been
argued that with the concept of limited liability, the separation of ownership and management has driven
capitalism to prosper as it provides companies an easier access to capital. However, this separation often
leads potential conflicts of interest within the business organizations.
2. Fiduciary Duty
Under the business laws of most countries, corporate managers have a fiduciary duty to the all of
the shareholders. Fiduciary refers to a legal or ethical relationship of trust between two or more parties.
Often the term is used to describe a person appointed and authorized to hold assets in trust for another
person. The fiduciary manages the assets for the benefit of the other person rather than his or her own
profit. Different shareholders might have different investment objectives. Nevertheless, regardless of their
financial circumstances, most asset owners would like to be better off rather than worse off. Therefore,
fiduciary duty is usually interpreted as managers' duty to maximize the owners' wealth. However, it has
been often observed that managers pursue their own self-interest at the expense of shareholders.
3. Conflict of Interest
In The Wealth of Nations, Smith (1776) states, "being the managers rather of other people's
money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious
vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the
stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master's honour,
and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must
always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company."(330)
Fama and Jensen (1983) also warn that without effective control procedures, managers are more
likely to take actions that deviate from the interest of residual claimants. (5)
What induces managers to attempt to derive private benefits at the expense of asset owners is
information asymmetry. According to agency theory, usually the insiders of the corporations including
the managers have more access to information than the outsiders including the shareholders. Therefore, it
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is often possible for the managers to prioritize their private benefits over that of their clients without being
caught or interrupted.
Managers can exploit information asymmetry by not taking risky investment projects to secure
their position (Avoiding Risk), or taking up unprofitable projects to increase their compensation and
reputation within industries (Empire building), allocating resources within the subsidiaries to benefit
themselves (Tunneling and Propping, Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton, 2003), or engaging in deals to self-
benefit deals (Self-dealing, Djankov et al., 2008). These are often described as typical agency problems.
(Brealey, Myers, Allen, 291)' In the US, agency problem refers to the conflict between shareholders and
the management. Outside the US, it refers to the conflict between controlling shareholders, usually the
founding families who are also the managers of the corporations, and minority shareholders.2
4. Corporate Governance
These agency problems have led modem firms to establish a system of control, called corporate
governance. Corporate governance is defined as the legal and regulatory mechanisms that set
management objectives in a corporation and monitor and evaluate managers. The purpose of corporate
governance is to achieve the corporate objectives and ensure accountability, fairness, and transparency in
the company's relationship with all its stakeholders by overseeing corporate management. The parties
involved in corporations include shareholders, creditors, suppliers, customers, communities, board of
directors, executives, and other employees.
In a typical corporation, shareholders, in lieu of direct participation, elect a board of directors to
represent them in various corporate affairs. The board of directors makes rules on how the corporations
should be run, sets policy, evaluates the performance of the management, and hires new managers.
According to Berk and Demarzo, however, the board of directors delegate most decisions to corporate
management including day-to day operation. (922)
5. Corporate Governance in Practice
The country's legal environment plays an important role in corporate governance practice. La
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) state that the legal rules to protect investors and the
quality of legal enforcement differ systematically across countries, producing vast differences in the
nature and effectiveness of financial systems around the globe. (33) They further outline that the common
law system provides more minority shareholder protection than the civil law system. For instance,
countries in the common law environment, including the US and the UK, allow more controls to minority
'Brealey, Myers, and Allen summarize the typical characteristics as following:
- Reduced effort: Managers intentionally avoid high-effort, high-pressure positive NPV projects.
- Perk: Managers take private benefits on a non-financial format.
- Empire building: Managers take unprofitable projects in order to increase their influence and enjoy the prestige of
running a large organization.
- Entrenching investment: Managers take projects that can reward the skills of existing managers.
2- Avoiding risk: Managers do not take positive NPV projects to avoid the risk of losing jobs.
According to La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) and Anderson and Reed (2003), a large fraction of
the companies around the world are family controlled. Family-controlled firms include not only privately held firms
but also publicly held firms: 65% of the 20 largest firms in Argentina, 70% of the 20 largest companies in Hong
Kong (La Porta et al.), and 35% of S&P500 companies in the US (Anderson and Reed, 1302).
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shareholders than those countries in the civil law regime, like France, Germany, and Scandinavian
countries, do. (6)
Fama and Jensen (1983) point out that the stock market provides a monitoring mechanism to
organizations. They claim that stock prices provide signals that summarize the implications of internal
decisions regarding the profitability of the corporations. Hence, an active stock market forces managers to
run the corporations on behalf of their shareholders. (16)
An active takeover market also affects corporate governance practices. (Fama and Jensen, 16)
When a company is poorly managed, often a third party takeover provides final remedy; it replaces
incompetent managers and re-structures the firm so that the company becomes more efficient. The
possibility of takeover disciplines the board of directors and managers to work toward the best interest
shareholders, as well as provides more room for the minority shareholders to exercise their voting rights
on corporate affairs.
Each country's corporate governance regime reflects that nation's political, social, institutional,
cultural, and economical environment. Referring to the prevalence of family control in Korea, Kang
(2005) points out that a company's corporate governance results from the business entity's market
adaptation to each country's unique environment. (35) He states that in order for companies in developing
countries to conform to US and UK style of corporate governance (Democratic Governance), the
preconditions have to exist - a perfect privatization of financial industry, a flexible labor market, a
developed capital market, a better credit scoring system, an improvement in transparency in overall
business practice, and a removal of the barriers to exit from business. (36)
In the US corporate managers tend to focus on shareholder maximization. However, outside US,
especially in Japan, managers are expected to serve the interests of all stakeholders, such as the
government, employees, suppliers and consumers, as well the shareholders.3 However, regardless of the
location or culture, corporate governance system exists to mitigate the conflicts of interest among
different stakeholders.
3 A majority of respondents in US and UK belive that corporations should focus on maximizing shareholders' best
interest. On the other hand, in Japan and European countries, many people believe that corporations' primary
objective is not maximizing the share value. According to a survey by East Economics Magazine (1995), in US and
UK 75.8% and 70.5% of participants respectively responded that corporations should prioritize the shareholders'
interest over those of other stakeholders, while 97% of participants in Japan (82% in Germany and 78% in France)
responded that corporations should serve all stakeholders' interests. Responding to the question as to what is more
important between the objectives of paying dividends and providing job security to employees, 89.2% of survey
participants in the US and 89.3% in the UK said that paying dividends is more important. In the same survey, 97.1%
of survey participants in Japan, 59.1% in Germany, and 60.4% in France responded that providing job security is
more important. (Hwang et al. 1999. (39).)
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B. Corporate Democracy vs. Corporate Dictatorship
1. The Debate
Kang (2005) notes that when a founding family runs a corporation, their participation allows the
firm to reduce agency costs since the controlling family, as insiders, can monitor and evaluate the
management performance better than outsiders. He points out that the reduction of agency costs enables
these firms to increase firm value more than other firms in the industry. (22) However, this argument
overlooks the possibility that all shareholders' interests are not perfectly aligned. For instance, for some
controlling shareholders to maintain corporate control is more important than to make additional capital
gains from their investments because as long as they have corporate control, they can use the company's
resources to benefit themselves.
La Porta, et al. (2000) state that when investor rights, including those of minority investors, are
poorly protected, corporate insiders gain opportunities to expropriate efficiently. (13) In many family
controlled corporations in developing countries, it is often observed that the founding families maximize
their utilities through tunneling capital and resources away from minority shareholders.
Bertrand and Schoar point out that corporate empire building, a typical phenomenon of the
concentrated ownership structure, impedes economic development within nations where these
corporations reside. (74) Morck, Strangeland, and Yeung (2000) observe that if poorly managed firms
survive, this can create barriers to the entry of new firms. (41) Referring to Schumpeter's "Capitalism,
Social and Democracy (1942)," Fogel, Morck, Yeung (2008) argue that if few firms dominate a country's
economy, this deters creative destruction, a process that stimulates the economy when upstart innovative
firms replace old and inefficient companies. (25)
According to La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), if a country's legal
environment is unfavorable, this discourages minority investors from participating in the financial market,
leaving the capital market inefficient and making it difficult for innovative firms to grow. (1149) Brown,
Martinson, and Petersen (2011) note that the presence of an efficient equity market is important for firms
to grow businesses since the nature of most companies' R&D often does not allow firms to use debt
financing to raise capital. (1)
Some academics suggest that weak corporate governance can increase macro risk in a region's
economy. Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (1999) contend that weak corporate governance had an
important negative effect such as radical currency depreciation and stock market declines during the
Asian financial crisis of 1997. (11)
Despite these negative economic externalities, some academics and business practitioners argue
that concentrated corporate governance leads to economic outperformance in the long run, for the
following reasons:
First, companies under concentrated control allow managers to make prompt business decisions
as under concentrated ownership control important business decisions are usually made at the discretion
of a few controlling shareholders. For instance, in certain capital intensive manufacturing industries
where price competition is severe, making timely decision to scale facilities ahead of competitors is
important because the first mover advantage can secure economies of scale in production. Dictatorship
corporate governance, a corporate governance style in which the firm is solely controlled by only a few
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shareholders, allows the firm management to make important decisions without lengthy negotiations to
convince the board and the minority shareholders.4
Second, some say that the concentrated ownership control enables management to embrace long-
term business strategies. People who criticize investors' short-termism claim that if investors care only
about receiving dividends and short-term capital gains, corporations might not have enough capital to
invest for long term projects, like investment in research and development. When a company is controlled
by shareholders whose primary focus is not to make capital gains and consequently do not push their
managers to increase short term profits, the managers can make long term investment decisions without
worrying too much about short-term repercussions. They claim that companies under concentrated control
tend to make long term business relationships with various parties, creating intangibles that increase firm
value.
Third, some claim that if a corporation is controlled by a few shareholders who have more
knowledge and experience in the firm's business and culture, their expertise will allow the company to
prosper in the long run. This idea provides the basis for some technology companies, such as Google and
LinkedIn, to establish a dual class share structure, a structure that allows a group of a certain type of
security holders, usually founding members who are expected to know more about the culture and
business of these companies, to exercise more voting power than the owners of other types of shares.
Outside the US, this knowledge and culture argument is deployed by advocates of concentrated control to
enhance founding family's management control. Those in favor of family control argue that since family
members grew up listening to business affairs, they are more knowledgeable than outsiders about
business affairs, thus making them the most competent leaders of their organizations.5
Fourth, concentrated ownership control enables corporations to easily diversify business and
maintain market position for longer periods. Kang (2005) observes that building an empire is one of most
important growth strategies for corporations. (21) For instance, some well-known Asian conglomerates
have maintained their competitiveness by tunneling the extra resources of cash cows to subsidize
businesses in growing industries.
Some even argue that diversification allows corporations to weather fluctuations in economic
cycles, helping them stay in business for longer periods. According to Modigliani-Miller, investors can
diversify their risks on their own and hence they do not have to worry about idiosyncratic risks including
default risk of a corporation they invest in. However, in societies that encourage business people to
improve overall social welfare, corporate managers are expected to serve various stakeholders' interests
and carry an implicit obligation to help the firms to stay in business. Their goal is to preserve jobs in the
economy and to minimize the negative economic and social impacts related to defaults.6
4 At the media conference held in Berlin in 2010, Choi, Ji Sung, the CEO of Samsung Electronics said, "The most
important task within a firm is to determine large capital investments and to decide the size and the timing of such
investments. Only the owner can make such a decision that a CEO cannot see. The performance gap between
corporations under an owner's management control and without it is huge." [IFA 2010] Choi, Ji Sung, CEO of
Samsung Electronics, interviewed by Han, Joo Yeup. "Recovery of Ownership in Management Leadership - Next
Year Investment to be 30 trillion Korean Won." 5 Sep 2010. Digital Daily. Web. 3 1March 2013.
5 Bellow (2003) refers to the Rothschild family as an example.
6 In some countries, government subsidizes domestic businesses to grow the nations' economies. They use tax
payers' money either to provide direct funding or to guarantee. When a country privatizes government owned
corporations that monopolized certain industries, in return for selling those firms to local firms at a cheap price, the
governments implicitly ask the firms to provide more economic or social contributions to the nation. Furthermore,
some developing countries intentionally depreciate their currencies to support exporters' business.
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Finally, Bertrand and Schoar note that in countries with high level of corruption, political
connections provide large benefits for private firms. According to them, companies with concentrated
ownership control, especially family controlled companies, are well positioned to take government
contracts, subsidized credit, or favorable legislation, utilizing their extensive kinship networks that stretch
across the political and business realms. (77)
2. Review of Empirical Studies on Corporate Governance
2. a. Democratic Governance Performs Better
What is the relationship between corporate governance and firm value? Different academic
studies give different answers to this question.
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) (hereafter GIM) found that during the 1990s firms with
stronger minority shareholder protections tended to perform better and increase firm value more than
comparable firms with weaker minority shareholder protections. Deriving data from Investor
Responsibility Research Center, GIM construct proprietary governance index with 24 characteristics
related to shareholder rights. They name the companies whose score within the highest decile of the index
as "Dictatorship Portfolio" and the lowest decile of the index as "Democracy Portfolio." (109)
GIM ran regressions to find correlations with the governance index and firm value represented by
industry adjusted Tobin's Q. The coefficients of the governance variable are negative every year and
significantly negative in nine of ten years during the 1990s. This implies that governance allowing more
shareholders' rights is positively correlated with greater firm value. Based on this empirical test, GIM
conclude that companies with the stronger shareholder protection outperformed firms with weaker
shareholder protection in terms of firm value generation. Lawellen and Metrick (2010) re-examine GIM's
study and confirm that corporations with stronger shareholder rights are likely to make significant
positive industry adjusted abnormal returns. (34)
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang (hereafter CBW) (2012) study the relationship between governance
and abnormal stock return using GIM's methodology with samples from 2000 and 2008. They find that
the governance-return correlation disappeared in 2000 because of market participants' learning to
appreciate the difference between well-governed and poorly governed firms. (35) CBW note that having
witnessed large scale corporate scandals, such as those of Enron and WorldCom in early 2000, investors
realized the importance of corporate governance and have responded accordingly. Since the different
qualities of firms' corporate governance have already been incorporated in the share prices and price
adjustment occurred only once, it is impossible for companies under democratic governance to
continuously outperform those under dictatorship governance.
2. b. Negative or Neutral
After examining GIM's study, Bauer, Koedijk, and Otten (2002) point out that what seems to be a
positive correlation actually results from bias, such as industry and small cap. vs. large cap. Their research
suggests that in contrast to GIM's argument, the impact could be negligible.
Anderson and Reeb (2003) examine the relationship between the family ownership, which does
not allow minority shareholders to participate in firms' affairs, and firm performance, using S&P500
samples. They conduct regression analysis to examine the relationship between the fractional equity of
the firm's founding family and the firm value represented by Tobin's Q. Their research shows that family
companies tend to have significantly higher Tobin's Q than nonfamily controlled comparables. (1314)
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Johnson, Moorman & Sorescu (2009) (hereafter JMS) criticize GIM's study advocating positive
correlation with democratic governance and firm value for using too broadly defined industry
classification. (GIM use FF 48 classification standard). JMS use three-digit Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) and find that abnormal returns shown on the GIM governance portfolio were due to
the different characteristics of corporate governance and were in fact close to zero. JMS claim that the
abnormal returns reported by GIM were due to an artifact of industry clustering or an imprecise asset
pricing model. (6)
Analyzing Korea's listed companies' financial performance between 2001 and 2003, Kang (2005)
argues that corporations under dictatorship governance in conglomerates empirically perform better in
terms of performance measured by Return-on-Asset, Net Operating Income, and Stock Returns. (30)
However, I find this study is not universally applicable, since the results reflect a unique characteristics of
the regional economy in which large conglomerates dominate most of industries.
There is an on-going debate among researchers on the correlation of style of corporate
governance and firm value. Many agree that the result is still inconclusive.
C. The Influence of Institutional Investors on Firm Value
1. Definition and Role
Institutional investors are organizations which pool large sums of money and invest these sums in
securities, real properties, and other investment assets. Types of typical investors include banks, insurance
companies, retirement or pension funds, hedge funds, investment advisors and mutual funds. Like
corporate managers who have fiduciary duty to shareholders of corporations, institutional investors have
fiduciary duty to maximize the wealth of the asset owners.
Table 1: Types of Institutional Investors7
Types of Asset Under
Institutional Description Management (2010)8
Investor (In trillions USD)
Pension Funds Any plan, fund, or scheme that provides retirement income 25.8
Bank Financial intermediaries involved in taking deposits and lending money 96.49
Insurance Provides financial protections in return for premium. 18.0
Company
Mutual Funds A type of collective investment vehicle that pools money from many 24.0
mnvestors to purchase securities
Foundation Grant making institutions funded by gift and investment assets N/A
Long-term funds owned by operating non-profit institutions such as
Endowment universities, hospitals, museums, and other organizations involved in 2.4
charitable activities
Hedge Funds / Actively managed private investment funds, subject to few regulatory 2.2Private Equity restrictions
Sovereign State-owned investment fund composed of financial assets 1.5Wealth fund____
7 "Institutional Investment." Wikipedia. The Free Encyclopedia. Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. 22 July 2004. Web. 23
March 2013
8 International Monetary Fund, "Global Financial Stability Report." September 2011
9 TheCityUK. "Banking 2010." Chart 7-8. IFSL Research. 3-4.
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2. Development of Institutional Investors' Activism
When investors are not satisfied with the corporations they have invested in, they can sell their
stocks and leave. This is the so-called Wall-Street-walk. Gillian and Starks (2007) state that this can have
disciplinary effects on companies.
In 1980s and early 1990s, institutional investors' equity ownership increased rapidly. According
to Sias and Starks, large institutions' ownership of the securities listed in the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) increased from 24% in 1980 to almost 44% in 1994, due to the growth of pension funds. (2877)
Gillian and Stark note that institutional investors held only 10% of US equities in 1953 but that their
ownership exceeded 60% by the end of 2005. (278)
But, this increase in ownership makes it difficult for the institutional investors to liquidate their
shares when they are not satisfied with the management performance of the companies because their
unloading could bring a significant impact on the share price. In other words, when institutions' stake
increases, the costs of liquidation also increases. (278)
The cost concern led institutional investors to actively engage in the target companies' affairs to
increase the value of their investments.' As of now, many institutional investors already have exercised
significant influence on the firms in which they have invested.
Gillian and Starks say that the main motivation for shareholder activism was to increase the
shareholder value. They point out that when investors are not satisfied with managers' performance in
terms of creating shareholder value, the investors exercise their voting rights to increase firm value. Such
an engagement is thought to be effective in dealing with agency problems. (276) For instance, when
minority investors, including institutional investors, are not satisfied with performance of a management,
they can replace the management to increase firm value by electing board members who would respect
their interests.
In 1986 and 1987, large public pension funds began actively exercising their voting rights to
submit shareholder proposals. According to Gillian and Starks, most of those proposals were to repeal
anti-takeover amendments, to adopt cumulative voting, or to enhance board independence. (284)
In the mid-1980s, the Department of Labor issued an opinion that parties managing assets in
ERISA-governied pension plans have the fiduciary duty not only to vote all of their portfolio shares but
also to do so in accordance with a "Prudent Man Standards."" (Nathan and Mehta, 1) The Security and
Exchange Commission (SEC) Division of Investment Management also issued a similar ruling that
investment advisors have obligation to vote all shares in the managed portfolios in accordance with duty
of loyalty and duty of care. (Nathan and Mehta, 5)
In 2003, the SEC began requiring mutual funds to disclose their proxy voting policies and voting
records on form N-PX. In 2009 alone, there were 20,000 proxy proposals at Russell 3000 companies, and
institutional investors cast more than 3.9 million individual votes off those proposals. (Bew and Fields, 5)
As a result of these changes, institutional investors have become more active at achieving their objectives
through their exercise of voting rights.
Despite this development, many find that institutional investors' active shareholder engagement is
insufficient. This is partially due to the costs associated with oversights and engagement. For instance,
1 O'Neill and Swisher (2003) find that insider trading is less correlated with large institutional investor ownership.
" ERISA requires fiduciaries to act prudently, solely in the interest of the plan's participants and beneficiaries and
for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits and defraying reasonable plan expenses. "Section 404(a)" ERISA.
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managers of mutual funds that invest in stocks of a thousand companies might find it difficult to attend all
the shareholder meetings and would have little time to review all the proposals.
Since most Institutional Investors do not have sufficient resources to analyze proxy proposals,
they tend to rely on outside proxy advisory firms. Proxy advisors provide institutional investors advice on
governance issues, guidelines, and recommendations on specific ballot issues, and voting platform
services. Currently in the US two advisory firms dominate the market: ISS and Glass, Lewis & Co. In
most cases, institutional investors follow the advisory firm's recommendations. According to Bew and
Field, researchers agree that the voting outcomes of institutional investors, especially mutual funds, are
more closely aligned with proxy advisors' recommendations than those recommended by managers. (8)
Some investors set their own guidelines and have exercised voting rights accordingly. In the US,
California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) and the Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Association - College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) are renowned for their active shareholder
engagement using their proprietary guidelines.
Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2009) point out that there are stronger financial incentives for hedge funds
to actively exercise their voting rights. For hedge funds, revenues are based on performance fees, and
hedge fund managers put significant proportion of their private money in the funds they manage. Hedge
funds are relatively less regulated and are not subject to Employment Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA), a mandate that stipulates asset managers' fiduciary duty to clients. (2) Unlike mutual
funds, hedge funds are not required to diversify their holdings. Therefore, hedge fund managers can easily
accumulate large stakes in target companies. Moreover, hedge funds usually do not have other business
relationships with the companies they invest in. Finally, most hedge funds have 'lock-up' provisions that
prevent investors from taking capital out of the funds. These enable certain hedge funds to take a long
term position and to pursue activist investing mandate. (3)
According to OECD and IFC, outside US, institutional investors' active engagement has often
fallen short of the potential. In 2004 revision of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, OECD
recommends institutional investors to be more actively involved in corporate affairs to improve corporate
governance of target companies.
3. Concerns on Institutional Investor Activism
Nevertheless, some argue that institutional investors' active engagement could destroy firm value.
First, the people who believe concentrated governance allows firms to prosper say that
institutional investors are only interested in their short term return on investment. Therefore, their active
involvement in corporate decisions ultimately forces the management to focus on improving short term
profitability at the expense of long term growth potential. Instead of investing capital for future growth,
they argue, those companies under diversified control tend to focus on cost cutting and redistribution of
capital to investors, undermining their long term growth prospects.
A second argument is that institutional investors usually do not have the expertise to maximize
firm value. Therefore, investors' active engagement negatively affects firm value maximization. Usually
company managers have more knowledge than financial investors. It has been argued that the decisions
suggested by financial investors are not likely to be the optimal strategy for shareholder maximization in
the long run.
A third argument is that not all institutional investors' objectives are on firm value maximization.
For instance, socially responsible investing includes investment objectives other than shareholder
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maximization, they argue that if those investors have more say about the firms' operations, it would make
it more difficult for the managers to implement value maximizing strategies that might create socially
undesirable externality.
4. Review of Empirical Studies on Institutional Investor's Activism on Firm Value
4. a. Positive:
Anson, White, and Ho (2005) assess the impact of CalPERS (California Public Employees'
Retirement System), an active institutional investor, on firm value. They examine the performance and
shareholder values of companies on the CalPERS "Focus List" - a list of public companies with poor
corporate governance principles and poor financial perfornance. (102)
Anson, White, and Ho's event study of the inclusion in Focus List shows that companies on the
list provided more returns to shareholder after CalPERS made investment than those comparable firms
not on the list over 1992-2001 period. The wealth effect was greater for those firms with larger market
capital, diverse shareholder base, more analyst coverage, and firms previously identified as bad
performers in the stock market. (111)
Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (hereafter AEFM, 2010) examine the effect of institutional
investor's active shareholder engagement in 23 countries between 2003 and 2008. AEFM's study focuses
on 5,000 US companies and 2,000 non-US companies. Utilizing 41 governance attributes derived from
RiskMetrics, they construct a governance index. This governance index incorporates measure of board
structure, anti-takeover provisions, auditor selections, and compensation and ownership structure. They
first examine how institutional investors' share ownership affects this governance index. (3)
AEFM's empirical study indicates that there is a positive relationship between the institutional
investor ownership, especially for foreign institutional investors, and democratic corporate governance
practices around the world. AEFM further examine the causal relationship between the institutions'
ownership and corporate governance. They discovered that institutional investor ownership leads to
change in corporate governance, not vice versa.
Through regression analyses, AEFM discover that institutional investors without any business
relationship with target companies are likely to bring more positive impact on the corporate governance
of the target companies than those institutions with pre-existing relationship. 12 Also in a legal
environment, where shareholder protection is not strong, foreign institutional investors from countries
with stronger legal protection bring positive influence on governance than domestic institutional investors.
Regarding causality, they find ownership of institutional investors, especially foreign investors, leads to
change in governance, not vice versa. (32)
AEFM further investigate whether institutional ownership makes a difference in terms of firm
valuation. AEFM replicate the results in Ferreira and Matos (2008) with non-US companies for the period
2003 to 2008. They find that the correlation coefficients between institutional investor ownership and
12 AEFM recognize that the different economic, social, and political environment of different countries affects
corporate governance practices. According to them, compared to foreign institutions, domestic institutions are likely
to have more business relationship with corporations which they are investing in. This encourages domestic
institutions to be loyal to the management of the target companies. The degree of legal protection for investors also
makes a difference. They find that in countries where investors' rights are not well protected, the domestic investors'
influence over corporate governance is limited.
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Tobin's Q are both positive for domestic and foreign investors. The correlation is especially significant
for the foreign institutions. Through regression analysis with variables in different time frames, AEFM
conclude that institutional investor ownership brings positive impact on firm value and the impact is
significant for the changes in foreign institutional investor's ownership. (33)
4. b. Negative or Negligible:
Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996) use Investor Responsibility Research Center's data
(IRRC data) on corporate governance proposals during 1987 and 1990 proxy seasons to study the impact.
They discover that there is not sufficient empirical evidence to indicate a positive relationship between
the proposals initiated by shareholders and the stock return. (29)
Gillian and Starks (2000) examine the shareholder activism by analyzing 2,042 corporate
governance proposals between 1987 and 1994, utilizing the IRRC data. (7) Gillian and Starks investigate
the share price appreciation over 150-day period and the 8-day period before and after the proposal
mailing date. From this empirical study, Gillian and Starks conclude that there is an insignificant negative
correlation between the shareholders' proposals and the stock return in general. (29)
Gillian and Starks acknowledge that there may be a large information effect regarding
institutional investor's proposal. Since the institutional investors usually attempt to privately negotiate
their proposals with the companies' managers before they officially submit the proposals, the public
announcement of such proposals could only signal the market of the managers' unwillingness to
accommodate the investor's requests. (6)
Analyzing S&P500 companies, Anderson and Reed (2003) find that firm value is negatively
correlated with unaffiliated blockholdings. (1321) Instead of institutional investors' blockholdings, they
discover that founding family's stakes are significantly positively associated with greater firm value.
(1324)
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang claim that even if there were significant positive correlation in the
past, as time goes by, it is not likely that such a correlation remains effective. The researchers repeat
GIM's study of 1990s for 2000 and 2008. They find that unlike the previous study, investing in
corporations with democratic governance does not help investors realize more profitable investment.
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Chapter III: Empirical Study
A. Data Description
As indicated in the previous chapter, with regard to the correlations between corporate
governance and firm value, as well as the relationship between the institutional ownership and firm value,
various studies provide different results dependent on the data and the methodologies that the researchers
adopt. In order to assess overall influence of institutional investors around the globe, it would be
necessary to analyze a data sample that is composed of companies incorporated in various countries and
to employ a methodology that provides more reasonable measure of the influence of institutional
investors.
Thomson Reuters releases Corporate Governance Score of corporations through the ASSET4
database. The ASSET4 Database is composed of over 4,100 listed companies in major global indices. The
ASSET4 Database has been widely used by professional investors to define socially responsible
investment strategies. The data include Environmental, Social, and Government scores of global
companies that are included in MSCI World, MSCI Europe, STOXX 600, NASDAQ 100, Russell 1000,
S&P 500, FTSE 100, ASX 300 and MSCI Emerging Market Indices.13
According to Thomson Reuters, this integrated ESG score is based on over 280 key performance
indicators (KPIs) and over 750 data points per company. According to Thomson Reuters, over 120
analysts collect only publicly available information. These analysts gather raw data from SEC filings,
annual reports and corporate sustainability reports, non-governmental organization websites, and news
sources.
Table 2: ASSET4 Information Structure
ASSET4 Information Strurture
* Cient Loyalty * Resource Reduction Employment Qtality * Board Structire
* Performance - Fmission Reduction * Healt4 & Safety - Compenation PcAy
SShareholden Loyalty * Product Innovation Trairing & Develop - Board functiom
- Dve~rsity e Sharehldrs Rigtqt
- H'uman.3f Right -WiuOn and Strategy
* community
- Product Reipowibllity
Moe than 250 indicators (cak ulated from data point values)
U'Mcr- than 7SO data poin~ts link tri pijblir t~asir~ R w Oat
THOMSON REUTERS. "ASSET4 ESG SCORES ON CREDIVIEWS"
" Founded in 2003, ASSET4 has collected data since the fiscal year 2002. ASSET4 was acquired by Thomson
Reuters in 2009. Over 120 analysts collect data and score corporations on economic, social, environmental, and
corporate governance dimensions. (There were data from 4,109 companies available as of March 25, 2013.)
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In this thesis, I use ASSET4's Corporate Governance Score as a proxy for corporate governance.
The Corporate Governance Score incorporates board structure, compensation policy, board functions,
shareholders rights, vision and strategies and give a higher score for those firms that provide more control
rights to minority shareholders.
Table 3: ASSET4 Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance Key Index' 4
Corporate Governance Pillar Score
Board Structure
Board Structure/Policy
Experience / Average years serving on Board
% Non-Executive Board Members
% Independent Board Members
CEO-Chairman Separation
Background and Skills
Size of Board (Number of Board Members)
Board Diversity
Board Function
% Audit Committee Independence
% Audit Committee Management Independence
Audit Committee Expertise
% Compensation Committee Independence
% Compensation Committee Management Independence
% Nomination Committee Independence
% Nomination Committee Management Independence
Number of Board Meeting
% Board Meeting Attendance Average
Compensation Policy
Compensation Policy
Highest Remuneration Package
Total Board Member Compensation
Stock Option Program
Senior Executive Long-term Compensation incentives
Vesting of Stock Options/Restricted Stock
Shareholder Rights
Shareholder Rights/Policy
Voting Rights
Ownership
Classified Board Structure
Staggered Board Structure
Vision & Strategy
Integrated Vision and Strategy Challenges and Opportunities
CSR Sustainability Committee
GRI Report Guidelines
CSR Sustainability Report Global Activities
CSR Sustainability External Audit
"4 Thomson Reuters. "ASSET4 on Datastream Company Level Template (DFO 2.0).xlsm" (2012).
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As of March 25, 2013, Thomson Reuter's ASSET4 universe is composed of approximately 4,109
companies across approximately 60 countries. I derive Corporate Governance Scores of corporations
from Asset4 database through Datastream. I also use Datastream to download companies' ROEs of the
current and the previous year, and ages. To derive Tobin's Q, institutional ownership, book value, and
sectors of a firm, I use Bloomberg. In order to study the most recent trend, I use corporate data since 2009.
Table 4: Data Summary
Category Year No. of Source TreatmentCompardes _____ _________ ____
2009 3,797
2010 3,795
Tobin's Q (Adjusted) Bloomberg Tobin's Q - Industry Median Tobin's Q
2011 3,689
2012 3,057
2009 3,349
2010 4,108
GOV 2011 3,315 ASSET4 Natural Log
2012 772
2009 4,045
2010 4,058
ROE Datastream
2011 4,076
2012 4,065
AGE 4,059 Datastrean Natural Log
2009 3,898
2010 3,855
BOOK VALUE Bloomberg Natural Log
2011 3,738
2012 3,077
2009 3,979
2010 3,979
INST HLDG Bloomberg
2011 3,979
2012 3,979
SECTOR Bloomberg Dummy variable (0,1)"
Total # of Companies 4,109 ASSET4in the Universe
i 5 Sector classifications were derived from Bloomberg.
24
Table 5: Countries of Domicile
209 2010 2011
Country of Domile # of companies % Country of Domicile # companies % Country of Domcilce of companies %
ABU DHABI 1 0.0% ABU DHABI 1 0.0% ABU DHABI 1 0.0%
AUSTRAUA 190 6.0% AUSTRALIA 269 7.5% AUSTRALIA 254 8.8%
AUSTRIA 20 0.6% AUSTRIA 18 0.5% AUSTRIA 14 0.5%
BELGIUM 27 0.8% BELGIUM 27 0.7% BELGIUM 22 0.8%
BRAZIL 37 1.2% BRAZIL 65 1.8% BRAZIL 37 1.3%
CANADA 240 7.5% CANADA 250 6.9% CANADA 171 5.9%
CHANNEL ISLANDS 1 0.0% CHANNEL ISLANDS 1 0.0% CHANNEL ISLANDS 1 0.0%
CHILE 13 0.4% CHILE 18 0.5% CHILE 11 0.4%
CHINA 51 1.6% CHINA 73 2.0% CHINA 46 1.6%
COLOMBIA 2 0.1% COLOMBIA 3 0.1% COLOMBIA 3 0.1%
CYPRUS 1 0.0% CYPRUS 1 0.0% CYPRUS 1 0.0%
CZECH REPUBLIC 4 0.1% CZECH REPUBUC 4 0.1% CZECH REPUBUC 2 0.1%
DENMARK 23 0.7% DENMARK 24 0.7% DENMARK 24 0.8%
DUBAI 1 0.0% DUBAI 1 0.0% DUBAI 1 0.0%
EGYPT 2 0.1% EGYPT 4 0.1% EGYPT 3 0.1%
FINLAND 26 0.8% FINLAND 27 0.7% FINLAND 26 0.9%
FRANCE 89 2.8% FRANCE 89 2.5% FRANCE 82 2.8%
GERMANY 74 2.3% GERMANY 76 2.1% GERMANY 72 2.5%
GREECE 22 0.7% GREECE 20 0.6% GREECE 12 0.4%
HONG KONG 87 2.7% HONG KONG 126 3.5% HONG KONG 96 3.3%
HUNGARY 3 0.1% HUNGARY 4 0.1% HUNGARY 4 0.1%
INDIA 30 0.9% INDIA 56 1.6% INDIA 52 1.8%
INDONESIA 14 0.4% INDONESIA 23 0.6% INDONESIA 10 0.3%
IRELAND 13 0.4% IRELAND 13 0.4% IRELAND 13 0.5%
ISRAEL 12 0.4% ISRAEL 13 0.4% ISRAEL 5 0.2%
ITALY 47 1.5% ITALY 46 1.3% ITALY 35 1.2%
JAPAN 401 12.6% JAPAN 402 11.2% JAPAN 353 12.2%
JORDAN 1 0.0% JORDAN 1 0.0% JORDAN 1 0.0%
KAZAKHSTAN 1 0.0% KAZAKHSTAN 1 0.0% KUWAIT 2 0.1%
KUWAIT 4 0.1% KUWAIT 4 0.1% LUXEMBOURG 4 0.1%
LUXEMBOURG 3 0.1% LUXEMBOURG 4 0.1% MALAYSIA 32 1.1%
MALAYSIA 16 0.5% MALAYSIA 39 1.1% MEXICO 12 0.4%
MEXICO 17 0.5% MEXICO 19 0.5% NETHERLANDS 32 1.1%
MOROCCO 2 0.1% MOROCCO 2 0.1% NEW ZEALAND 10 0.3%
NETHERLANDS 32 1.0% NETHERLANDS 33 0.9% NIGERIA 1 0.0%
NEW ZEALAND 10 0.3% NEW ZEALAND 10 0.3% NORWAY 19 0.7%
NIGERIA 1 0.0% NIGERIA 1 0.0% OMAN 1 0.0%
NORWAY 20 0.6% NORWAY 21 0.6% PERU 1 0.0%
OMAN 1 0.0% OMAN 1 0.0% PHILIPPINES 10 0.3%
PERU 1 0.0% PERU 1 0.0% POLAND 15 0.5%
PHIUPPINES 6 0.2% PHILIPPINES 11 0.3% PORTUGAL 12 0.4%
POLAND 10 0.3% POLAND 21 0.6% QATAR 2 0.1%
PORTUGAL 12 0.4% PORTUGAL 12 0.3% RUSSIAN FEDERATION 16 0.6%
QATAR 2 0.1% QATAR 2 0.1% SAUDI ARABIA 5 0.2%
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 30 0.9% RUSSIAN FEDERATION 30 0.8% SINGAPORE 39 1.4%
SAUDI ARABIA 6 0.2% SAUDI ARABIA 6 0.2% SOUTH AFRICA 45 1.6%
SINGAPORE 50 1.6% SINGAPORE 49 1.4% SOUTH KOREA 60 2.1%
SOUTH AFRICA 18 0.6% SOUTH AFRICA 48 1.3% SPAIN 35 1.2%
SOUTH KOREA 40 1.3% SOUTH KOREA 88 2.4% SRI LANKA 1 0.0%
SPAIN 44 1.4% SPAIN 43 1.2% SWEDEN 47 1.6%
SWEDEN 48 1.5% SRI LANKA 1 0.0% SWITZERLAND 52 1.8%
SWITZERLAND 61 1.9% SWEDEN 49 1.4% TAIWAN 56 1.9%
TAIWAN 24 0.8% SWITZERLAND 62 1.7% THAILAND 15 0.5%
THAILAND 11 0.3% TAIWAN 82 2.3% TURKEY 14 0.5%
TURKEY 16 0.5% THAILAND 20 0.6% UNITED KINGDOM 270 9.4%
UNITED KINGDOM 303 9.5% TURKEY 20 0.6% UNITED STATES 726 25.2%
UNITED STATES 965 30.3% UNITED KINGDOM 296 8.2% 0.0%
0.0% UNITED STATES 972 27.0% 0.0%
0.0% ZIMBABWE 1 0.0% 0.0%
Grand Total 3186 100.0% Grand Total 3604 100.0% Grand Total 2886 100.0%
Total # of Countries 57 Total# of Countries 59 Total# of Countries 56
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B. Institutional investors' Shareholder Engagement and Corporate Governance
1. Correlation
1. a. Test Method
In this part of the study, my purpose is to assess the overall impact of institutional investor
ownership on corporate governance. There are several ways by which institutional investors exercise
influence over the firm's operation. They can submit shareholder proposals, engage proxy fights to elect
board members who represent the institutional investors' interest, submit formal letters to the
management to express their dissatisfaction, or bringing a law suit against incumbent board members or
managers.
One of the most widely used proxies for active engagement is measuring the impact of filing
shareholder proposals. Shareholder proposal refers to a proposal for a publicly traded company to take a
certain course of action.16 However it is important to note that as Gillian and Starks point out it is possible
that the shareholder proposals only signal the managers' unwillingness to respect the investors' request to
maximize their investment. Hence, measuring the impact of proposals might not provide a reasonable
proxy for the influence of institutional investors on the firms.
A better alternative to measure the influence would be to measure the ownership held by
institutional investors. Assuming that most institutional investors are dedicated to fulfilling their fiduciary
duty, institutional investors' influence in corporations is proportion to their stakes in the companies.
Based on this assumption, I develop a hypothesis to measure the influence of institutional investors on
corporate governance as following:
Hypothesis 1: Institutional ownership is positively correlated with high Corporate Governance Score.
I run regression analysis on the ASSET4 data to see where there is positive correlation between
institutional investors' ownerships and the Corporate Governance Scores. I set the institutional ownership
as independent variable and Corporate Governance Score as dependent variable to examine the
correlation between institutional ownership and corporate governance through regression analyses.
First to examine whether correlation exists on absolute basis, I use recent institutional ownership
data and Corporate Governance Scores for this regression. " Significant outliers exist within the
16 Any shareholder who owns more than $2,000 in stock or 1% of the company is permitted to initiate a shareholder
proposal. It must be placed on the agenda and put to a vote at the next annual shareholders meeting. "Shareholder
Proposal." The Free Dictionary Internet. Web. 25 March 2013.
" As of March 21, only 772 companies' Corporate Governance Scores were available. Since many Corporate
Governance Scores of 2012 data are not yet available and neither Bloomberg nor Datastream provides previous
years ownership data, I had to use the most recent data for this analysis. In about 12% of the observation, the sum of
institutional investor ownership percentage exceeds 100%. This is because Bloomberg data team collects holdings
information from multiple sources and some of those reported holdings across different filings are duplicated. (This
is explanation by Bloomberg Help Desk. The collected data include 13Fs, US and International Mutual Funds,
Schedule Ds (US Insurance Companies) and Institutional stake holdings that appear on the aggregate level.). Before
running regression, I adjust these data by trimming down the share ownership over 100%.
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Bloomberg ownership data.'" I run linear regression to find correlation of two variables, institutional
investor ownerships and Thomson Reuter's Corporate Governance Score from ASSET4 database.' 9
CGe = a + fl1* Institutional Ownershipt+ et
In addition, to assess how the legal and market environment of different countries affect the
relationship between institutional ownership and firm value, I add more regression analyses such as the
following. First, I exclude the samples from three developed countries like US, UK, and Japan from the
pool and then run a regression with the remaining data sample. Second, I further limit the samples, so that
the data only include companies in the emerging markets and then run regression with the selected data.
In selecting companies that reside in emerging markets, I use MSCI Emerging Markets Index, which is
composed of indices of 21 countries, such as Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Philippine, Poland, Russia,
South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey.20
1. b. Result
I find positive correlations between institutional investor ownership and democratic corporate
governance in my analysis of the entire corporate pool between 2010 and 2012. Compared to the tests
using year 2010 and 2011 data (R-square below 0.01), the analysis with 2012 data provides more
explanatory power (R-square 0.08).
The correlation coefficients of the test using all data sample are all positive in 2010, 2011, and
2012 (B = 0.00005 in 2010, 0.000004 in 2011, and 0.29 in 2012 respectively.). In the test with 2012 data,
the correlation coefficient is 0.292. The t-statistics is 6.248. If I set a null hypothesis stating that there is
no positive relationship between the two, I could reject the null hypothesis at 95% confidence level. The
95% confidence interval is between 0.2 and 0.39. Therefore it might as well be said to be at 95% of
probability, 1% of institutional investor ownership translates to 0.2 - 0.4 point increase in Corporate
Governance Score.
However, when limiting the sample either by eliminating corporations in US, UK, and Japan, the
correlation coefficients become almost zero (in 2010 and in 2011) or slightly negative (B = -0.05 in 2012)
The correlation coefficients of the linear regressions using the emerging market data only, the correlation
coefficients are all slightly negative for all three years. They are close to zero in 2010 and 2011 and
negative in 2012 (B = -0.16). When limiting the data sample by excluding all companies in developed
countries, the t-scores decrease. In 2010, the t-score of the entire sample is 2.33. For the same year, the t-
scores of the data excluding US, UK, and Japan and those of emerging market sample are 2.0 and -0.43
respectively.
Therefore, it seems obvious that the positive correlation between institutional investor ownership
and corporate governance tend to be positive and strongly correlated in developed countries as compared
to developing countries.
19 Since Bloomberg only provides most recent ownership data, I chose to use Corporate Governance Scores for the
year 2012. Since many Corporate Governance Scores for the year 2012 have not become available as of 25 March, I
run the regression with 402 companies' data using the Corporate Governance Score as dependent variable and
institutional investors' share ownership as independent variable.
2 0
"Index Definition - Tools and Data" MSCL Web. 14 April 2013.
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Although the test result has weak explanatory power (R-square 0.002, 0.0008, 0.09 in 2010, 2011,
and 2012), it seems obvious that overall institutional ownership is correlated with high Corporate
Governance Score, but the degree of positive correlation varies according to the countries' characteristics.
In general, the correlations between institutional ownership and corporate governance are positive when
the pools include more developed countries, while it becomes zero or slightly negative when the portion
of emerging market companies in the dataset increases.
Table 6: The Influence of Institutional Investors' Ownership on Corporate Governance Score
I run linear regression to find correlations between two variables, institutional investor ownerships and Thomson Reuter's
Corporate Governance Score from ASSET4 database for corporate data between 2010 and 2012. 1 set the institutional ownership
as independent variable and Corporate Governance Score as a dependent variable to examine the correlation.
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1. c. Discussion
This test result suggests that in general there is a positive correlation between institutional
ownership and democratic Corporate Governance Score. The correlations tend to be positive and stronger
in the developed market companies while they are zero or slightly negative in the developing market
firms.
It is important to note that the test result proves a positive correlation between corporate
governance and firm value but not causalization between these variables. In other words, it is both
possible that institutional ownership leads to improvements in governance practices and also that
democratic governance practices induce more institutional investors' investments. The causal relationship,
however, does not seem to be clear. I will adumbrate possible explanations for both these cases. (The
causal relationship will be studied in the next part of empirical analysis in greater detail.)
First, if institutional investors' increasing ownership leads improvements in governance practices,
the stronger positive correlation in developed markets could suggest that if there are less regulatory or
institutional constraints, institutional investors can make a positive impact on governance practices.
Second, if corporations' democratic governance practices induce institutional investors' stakes in
corporations - the stronger positive correlation in developed countries might indicate that in terms of
making investment decisions, educated investors tend to prefer making investments in companies with
democratic governance.
Because of barriers to international trade, it could be assumed that there are more domestic
investors than foreign investors in any country, and further that these investors tend to be more educated
in developed markets. It seems reasonable to assume that these educated investors tend to make their
investment decisions based on academic theories. After the publication of Fama and Jensen's, "Separation
of Ownership and Control (1983)," many finance professional have learned about agency theory.
According to this theory, it is likely that a corporation with democratic governance outperforms other
firms in terms of financial performance. Therefore it might be natural for educated investors to prefer to
invest in companies with democratic governance to ensure better returns.
What could explain this weak explanatory power of the test result? If institutional investors'
increasing ownership leads an improvement in governance, this test result would indicate that the
composition of institutional investors or the countries' market environment do create differences in terms
of the relationship between institutional ownership and corporate governance.
In developing markets, the weaker legal protection for minority shareholders and inefficient
capital markets make the market less attractive from the foreign investors' point of view, inducing fewer
foreign investments in the market. Previous studies, including those by Gillian and Starks and AEFM,
suggest that foreign institutional investors tend to be more active as compared to domestic investors who
are likely to have business relationships with the target companies. It seems possible that the higher
percentage share ownership held by domestic institutional investors in developing countries is the reason
for a weaker correlation between the institutional ownership and democratic governance practices.
In some developing countries, the lack of legal protections for minority shareholders does not
permit institutional investors to be active, resulting in a weaker correlation between their percentage
ownership and the degree of activism in corporations.
This test does not account for the divergent characteristics of companies across different sectors.
As indicated in Table 10, companies in certain sectors, such as those that include various diversified
conglomerates, tend to have lower Corporate Governance Score than other sectors, such as energy. This
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might be largely due to the different nature of the businesses. Had this test accounted for such differences,
the test results would have been more robust.
The weak explanatory power might be due to the bias in sample selection. When creating Asset4
database, Thomson Reuters includes companies listed in major global indices such as MSCI World Index
and S&P500. Since those indices are widely used among the asset managers including index fund
managers, it is likely that institutional investors automatically invest in the companies that are included in
these indices over companies not included in these indices, and therefore institutional ownership could be
overly represented in these companies included in the major indices. Had I been able to precisely measure
the different impact of the stocks' inclusion in different indices and adjust the data accordingly, this
analysis would have been more robust.
Furthermore, even though ASSET4 data that are popularly used by Socially Responsible
Investors, the Corporate Governance Score might not be a perfect representation of the governance
practices of the target companies in terms of measuring diversified control. While examining ASSET4's
Key Performance Index, I find that some of the measurements do not fully incorporate the characteristics
of corporate governance in developing countries. For instance, ASSET4 Corporate Governance Score
does not account for the influence of controlling shareholders without legal title or rights, the real
influence of the boards in making important corporate decisions, or the records of white collar crimes in
corporations.
2 In some conglomerates in developing countries, often conglomerate chairmen, who neither have board
membership nor legal rights, exercise absolute control over the firms' operation.
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2. Causalization
2. a. Test Method
I further examine whether institutional ownership causes an improvement in corporate
governance. In order to assess the causality, I run a regression with independent variable and dependent
variable in different time frames. After an increase in institutional ownership, it would take time for the
firms' corporate governance to improve as board meeting and shareholder meeting take place only a few
times a year. In line with AEFM, I set the changes in institutional ownership at time t-1 as independent
variable and changes in Corporate Governance Score at time t (t = 2011) as dependent variable and then
run a regression.
ACGt = a + fl1* A Institutional Ownership t- _+ et
In order to assess whether causality exists in the opposite direction, I set that the change in
Corporate Governance Score at t-1 as independent variable and the institutional ownership at t as
dependent variable to run a regression (t = 2011).
A Institutional Ownershipt = a + (* ACG_ 1 + et
The different characteristics of the countries where institutional investors reside might have
differential impact on these analyses. Following the previous setting for the correlation, I first run a
regression with the entire data sample and then start limiting the dataset. After running the regression with
all data, I exclude US, UK and Japan corporations from the sample and then limit the sample to only
those firms that reside in the emerging markets as per the MSCI Emerging Market Index classification.
2. b. Result
The explanatory power of the test of the causal relationship is weak; in all tests, R-squares are
below 0.01, and t-scores are all below 95% confidence level. The correlation coefficients are all positive
in both directions. This suggests it is both possible that an increase in institutional investor ownership
results in an improvement in corporate governance and that an improvement in corporate governance
induces more institutional investors' investment in target companies.
In two out of three tests, the t-statistics is higher for the former. In the test using all data samples,
t-statistics is higher for the test in which a positive change in Corporate Governance Score leads to an
increase in institutional ownership in the subsequent period (t-statistics 1.705) than for the other test in
which an increase in institutional ownership leads to an increase in the governance score in the next
period (t-statistics 0.528). However, in the tests with the samples that exclude developed countries, it is
more likely that increase in institutional ownership leads to a positive change in Corporate Governance
Score in the subsequent period. In the sample which excludes US, UK, and Japan corporations, the t-
statistics of the former is 0.364 and the latter is -0.745. In the sample with emerging market data only, the
t-statistics of the former is 0.959 and the latter is 1.246.
There is a consistent pattern in the tests that examine the likelihood of influence of institutional
investor leading to the improvement in corporate governance toward a more democratic one. While
eliminating more companies in the developed countries from the sample, the t-statistics becomes larger.
(t-statistics of all data, data excluding US, UK, and Japan, and emerging market data are 0.529, 0.745, and
1.246 respectively.)
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Table 7: The Causal Relationship between the Change in Institutional Ownership and the Change in
Corporate Governance Score
In order to assess the causality, I run a regression with independent variables and dependent variables in different time frames. If
institutional investors' increasing stake leads to an increase in Corporate Governance Score, after an increase in institutional
ownership, it would take time for the firms' corporate governance to improve as board meeting and shareholder meeting take
place only a few times a year. In line with AEFM, I set the changes in institutional ownership at time t-1 as independent variable
and the changes in Corporate Governance Score at time t (t = 2011) as dependent variable and then run a regression. I assess
whether the causal relationship exists in the opposite direction. In the next test setting, I set the changes in Corporate Governance
Score at t-1 as independent variable and the institutional ownership at t as dependent variable.
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2. c. Discussion
The test does not provide strong evidence to support causality in either direction. However, it
shows that in emerging markets institutional investors' increasing ownership leads to subsequent
improvement in Corporate Governance Score of target companies rather than vice versa. This could
indicate that if there is room for improvement in corporate governance, institutional investors' increased
presence indeed puts more pressure on target firms' corporate governance practices, changing the
governance characteristics toward more democratic ones.
The test result indicates that after an increase in institutional ownership, subsequent marginal
improvement in corporate governance is larger in developing countries. According to the law of
diminishing return, an additional input leads to an increase in output at a decreasing rate. Therefore it is
possible that the greater presence of active investors would not lead to significant improvements in
corporate governance in developed countries that already provide strong investor protection. On the other
hand, the marginal improvement in corporate governance practices should be significant in developing
countries as there is more room for improvements.
In the analyses to assess the possibility that democratic corporate governance practices lead to
increase in institutional ownership, the t-statistics is the highest when the sample includes the maximum
number of developed market data. This might indicate that in developed countries the educated
investment managers prefer to invest in companies with democratic governance.
The weak explanatory power of this test could be explained in various ways. First, legal and
regulatory environment plays an important role in causal relationships. Different characteristics of
investors affect corporate governance of the companies in different degrees. As noted in the previous
discussion, in some countries, where minority investor protection is weak, the correlation between
institutional ownership and the influence of their engagement might not be strong.
Second, different characteristics of incumbent corporate governance of target companies could
also make a difference in terms of the influence of the institutional investors on corporate governance
practice. Here I set the test in such a way that the independent variable precedes the dependent variable by
a one year period. However, one year might not be long enough a time to measure such an impact for
certain corporations. For instance, if a corporation adopts staggered board, it would take at least three
years to replace all board members. Therefore it would not be possible to observe a significant
improvement in terms of corporate governance within a year.
Third, as noted in the previous test, this test setting does not incorporate the different sector
characteristics of corporations. Table 10 shows that companies that belong to certain sectors tend to have
higher governance scores. Had I adjusted the data for these differences, I would have acquired more
robust results.
Finally, here I assume linear independence between independent and dependent variables.
However, this might not be a valid assumption. Analyzing the influence of family control on firm value,
Anderson and Reed (2003) discover that in large public corporations, the influence of family's
concentrated control on firm value is nonlinear; they say that compared with firms with diversified
control, firm value of those firms first increases and then decreases, as the possibility of entrenchment
increases. (1324) It seems possible that such a nonlinearity also exists in my regression analyses.
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C. Corporate Governance and Firm Value
1. Test Method
In this section, I analyze the relationship between good corporate governance and firm value. I
assume that a firm's governance characteristics are reflected in the share price within unspecified period
of time. Therefore studying overall firm value rather than stock return for a certain period provides a more
reasonable indicator in measuring the governance effect. For this empirical analysis, I apply multivariate
regression analyses in line with GIM (2003) study. But, I use more recent and globally diversified data for
the analysis.
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive correlation between democratic corporate governance and firm value.
In measuring firm value, GIM use Tobin's Q, a ratio that measures the relative size of the market
value of a firm to the replacement cost of the firm's assets. The replacement cost is represented by the
asset value in the financial statement. In order to eliminate the effect of industry bias, GIM regressed
industry adjusted Q (Each firm's Q minus the median Q of the industry the company belongs to) with Xit,
a vector of governance variable and Wit, a vector of firm characteristics.
Qt = at + btXie + ceWi + eit
In line with GIM (2003), Shin and Stulz (2000), Daines (2001), Yermack (1996), and Bauer,
Gunster, and Otten (2003), I run multiple-regression that includes the company's book value (BV), age
(AGE), Return-on-Equity (ROE) in the current and previous year, and a vector of sector dummies (SD) as
independent variables and adjusted Tobin's Q as the dependent variable. Following GIM, I take natural
logs on CG, BV, and AGE. I run multiple regressions from 2009 to 2011 .23
Qit = a + f1* CGit + p2 * BVit + fls* AGEit + fl4* ROEtt + fls* RO E .. + fl6* SDit + eit
I calculate Tobin's Q ratio as following: (Market Capital + Liabilities + Preferred Equity +
Minority Interest) / Total Assets (Book Value). I adjust each firm's Tobin's Q by subtracting industry
median Tobin's Q of the universe. In line with Eccles, Ioannou, and Searfeim's study (2012), I exclude
financial sector samples. This is largely due to the difference between the nature of the business model of
the financial institutions and those of other business models and a significant degree of multicollinearity.
The numbers of financial institutions excluded from this empirical test are 639 in 2009, 707 in 2010, and
544 in 2011 respectively.
2 Tobin's Q has been frequently used by academics to estimate firn value. This is based on the belief that in the
long run the market value of a company should be equal to the replacement cost of the company's assets.
2 1 derive Corporate Governance Scores, ages, ROEs, industry classifications from Datastrean and book values in
US dollar, sector classifications, and Tobin's Q from Bloomberg.24 Eccles, Ioannou, and Searfeim (2012) study on sustainability on corporate behavior and performance use
Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database.
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Table 8: Industry Median Tobin's Q Ratio
TRBC Industry Group 2009 2010 2011 2012
No Industry Classification Available 1.305 1.305 1.305 1.305
Aerospace / Defense 1.428 1.428 1.428 1.428
Air Freight/ Courier Services 1.556 1.593 1.583 1.638
Airline Services 1.119 1.206 1.077 1.118
Automobiles / Auto Parts 1.113 1.360 1.174 1.176
Banking Services 1.016 1.023 1.002 1.009
Beverages 1.631 1.764 1.715 1.704
Biotechnology / Medical Research 2.074 2.315 1.813 2.085
Biotechnology / Pharmaceuticals 1.697 1.722 1.554 1.661
Chemicals 1.301 1.604 1.357 1.349
Coal 1.902 2.002 1.664 1.177
Commercial Services / Supplies 1.494 1.552 1.440 1.548
Communications Equipment 1.532 1.544 1.349 1.337
Computers / Office Equipment 1.474 1.420 1.346 1.222
Construction / Engineering / Materials 1.151 1.203 1.088 1.098
Construction Materials 1.223 1.217 1.116 1.116
Containers / Packaging 1.300 1.335 1.217 1.305
Diversified Trading / Distributing 0.992 1.076 1.051 1.023
Electric Utilities 1.143 1.115 1.110 1.102
Energy Related Equipment / Services 1.305 1.415 1.360 1.330
Financial Services - Diversified 1.042 1.060 1.074 1.054
Food / Drug Retailing 1.359 1.403 1.428 1.432
Food! Tobacco 1.325 1.494 1.413 1.458
Gas Utilities 1.188 1.260 1.203 1.191
Healthcare Equipment / Supplies 2.190 2.241 2.039 1.962
Healthcare Providers / Services 1.325 1.340 1.385 1.349
Homebuilding / Construction Supplies 1.073 1.112 1.044 1.083
Hotels / Entertainment Services 1.380 1.492 1.551 1.496
Household Goods 1.165 1.311 1.117 1.243
Industrial Conglomerates 1.055 1.138 1.096 1.118
Insurance 1.002 1.008 0.998 1.009
Investment Services 1.126 1.102 1.054 1.084
Investment Trusts 1.066 1.255 1.385 2.171
Leisure Products 1.586 1.738 1.633 1.526
Machinery/ Equipment/ Components 1.336 1.570 1.371 1.404
Marine Services 1.028 1.215 0.948 0.940
Media / Publishing 1.298 1.362 1.276 1.425
Metal / Mining 1.583 1.788 1.332 1.117
Oil / Gas 1.378 1.419 1.186 1.207
Paper / Forest Products 0.960 1.050 1.031 1.066
Personal / Household Products / Services 2.254 2.316 2.102 1.994
Rails / Roads Transportation 1.251 1.232 1.163 1.157
Real Estate Operations 1.047 1.045 0.950 1.005
REIT - Residential / Commercial 1.084 1.089 1.050 1.093
Renewable Energy 1.379 1.062 0.883 0.891
Retailers - Diversified 1.392 1.544 1.448 1.341
Retailers - Specialty 1.372 1.626 1.755 1.621
Semiconductors / Semiconductor Equipment 1.745 1.819 1.468 1.448
Software / IT Services 1.886 2.130 1.983 2.044
Telecommunications Services 1.403 1.480 1.435 1.469
Textiles / Apparel 1.465 1.843 1.334 1.698
Utilities - Multiline 1.101 1.118 1.136 1.143
Utilities - Water / Others 1.190 1.210 1.237 1.233
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Table 9: Sample Summary Statistics (Mean, Standard Deviation, Total Number)
2009 2010 2011
Mean Std N Mean N Mean Sd. N
______ ____ Deviaton Deviation ____ Deviaton __
ADJQ_09 0.2221 0.99085 3186 0.2895 1.169372 3604 0.2454 1.08542 2886
LN AGE 09 2.7504 0.60838 3186 2.7563 0.594327 3604 2.8502 0.55134 2886
LN BV 09 8.7941 1.65433 3186 8.7269 1.696508 3604 8.8693 1.70897 2886
LNCG_09 3.585 1.0568 3186 3.6257 1.019638 3604 3.7227 0.95136 2886
ROE 08 19.527 106.438 3186 92.891 5092.4747 3604 8.7635 52.8542 2886
ROE 09 4.4232 98.8139 3186 9.4973 147.8898 3604 13.042 29.8049 2886
Table 10: Sample Summary Statistics by Sectors (Min, Max, Mean)
2009 Sector Count ADJQ LNAGE LN.BV LNCG ROE_08 ROE_09
Basic Materials 317 0.298 2.650 8.102 3.559 13.832 4.807
Communications 253 0.415 2.572 8.733 3.485 37.995 -3.846
Consumer, Cyclical 403 0.166 2.851 8.429 3.481 17.136 -0.388
Consumer, Non-cyclical 476 0.426 2.789 8.295 3.723 21.243 16.019
Mean Diversified 35 -0.081 2.897 9.322 2.907 18.662 2.291
Energy 253 0.221 2.516 8.582 3.868 16.091 11.405
Financial 635 0.115 2.712 10.072 3.505 16.182 -2.350
Industrial 489 0.135 2.937 8.496 3.526 20.191 7.264
Technology 171 0.224 2.706 8.097 3.805 25.393 -4.361
Utilities 154 0.052 2.832 9.495 3.612 12.870 11.641
Max 14.189 3.367 14.897 4.575 5523.910 876.290
Min -1.715 0.000 2.328 0.270 -642.950 -3210.250
2010 Sector Count ADJ_Q LN.J.AGE LNBV LN.C ROEL09 ROE_10
Basic Materials 380 0.480 2.651 7.929 3.635 2.129 1.693
Communications 268 0.512 2.616 8.646 3.630 6.393 14.827
Consumer, Cyclical 472 0.242 2.852 8.371 3.487 2.396 5.014
Consumer, Non-cyclical 516 0.496 2.804 8.255 3.778 16.760 19.613
Diversified 45 -0.020 2.965 9.116 3.214 188.454 195.982
Mean Energy 275 0.294 2.531 8.485 3.993 1121.893 4.218
Financial 707 0.139 2.724 10.067 3.573 -0.484 1.827
Industrial 572 0.184 2.899 8.440 3.477 7.634 7.387
Technology 198 0.291 2.717 8.084 3.667 -2.438 -2.127
Utilities 171 0.075 2.813 9.488 3.704 11.309 11.983
Max _ 18.173 3.401 14.798 4.573 305570.100 8364.630
Min -1.481 0.693 2.502 0.507 -3210.250 -1834.190
2011 Sector Count ADJQ LNAGE LN.._CG ROE.10 -RE_11
Basic Materials 297 0.377 2.763 8.206 3.721 0.669 7.846
Communications 219 0.453 2.716 8.710 3.735 20.572 17.860
Consumer, Cyclical 386 0.215 2.938 8.535 3.608 5.018 12.205
Consumer, Non-cyclical 419 0.400 2.895 8.400 3.891 22.097 19.341
Diversified 31 0.006 3.025 9.144 3.379 12.489 15.602
Mean Energy 198 0.222 2.652 8.743 4.101 3.677 10.020
Financial 544 0.123 2.830 10.254 3.700 4.329 10.364
Industrial 490 0.142 2.970 8.537 3.578 7.957 12.850
Technology 172 0.320 2.786 8.205 3.711 3.214 15.711
Utilities 130 0.083 2.850 9.621 3.665 11.303 11.371
Max 25.612 3.434 14.847 4.567 2177.780 487.410
Min -1.294 0.693 3.700 0.489 -504.900 -411.530
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2. Result
From the empirical testing, I find that the correlation coefficients for corporate governance
variables are all positive during 2009 - 2011. The correlation is positive and significant especially in 2010
and 2011.
The correlation coefficients of Corporate Governance Scores are 0.015, 0.045, and 0.081 in 2009,
2010, and 2011 respectively. In other words, a 1% increase in the log of the Corporate Governance Score
is associated with 0.02% increase in Tobin's Q in 2009, 0.05% in 2010, and 0.08% in 2011.
The t-statistics are 0.931, 2.483, and 4.094 respectively for the same period. This indicates that at
95% confidence level the correlation was significant in 2010 and 2011. If I were to set a null hypothesis
such that there is no positive correlation between corporate governance and firm value represented by
Tobin's Q, I can reject this null hypothesis at 95% confidence level based on empirical tests with 2010
and 2011 data.
For robustness check, I examine the correlations among the independent variables. I confirm that
the correlations among the different variables for the three year periods are all less than 0.5. When I run
these multiple-regressions without sector dummies, I obtained similar results for each year.
I also try to examine the causal relationship between the Corporate Governance Score and Q. In
order to test whether changes in corporate governance lead to increase in Tobin's Q, I run regression on
changes in logs of Corporate Governance Scores from 2009 to 2010 on changes in Tobin's Q from 2010
to 2011. To test whether the causal relationship is in opposite direction, I run regressions to trace the
effect of changes in Tobin's Q from 2009 to 2010 on the logs of changes in Corporate Governance Scores
from 2010 to 2011.
The test on causalization shows that the correlation coefficient of the change in the log of
Corporate Governance Score on the changes in Tobin's Q is -0.1 and the correlation coefficient of
changes in Tobin's Q on the changes in the log of Corporate Governance Score is 0.008. However, I find
this result has weak explanatory power (The R-square of the former is 0.006 and the R square of the latter
is 0.000.)
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Table 11: Corporate Governance on Firm Value
I run multiple-regression that includes the company's book value (BV), age (AGE), Return-on-Equity (ROE) in the current and
previous year, and a vector of sector dummies (SD) as independent variables and adjusted Tobin's Q as dependent variable.
Following GIM, I take natural logs on CG, BV, and AGE. I run multiple regressions fiom 2009 to 2011.
Qit = a+ 01* CGit + $2* BVit + P3 * AGEit + N * ROEi, + Ps* ROEit-1 + P6* SDIt + eit
2009 2010 2011
unstandardized ndardized Unstandardized ndardized Unstandardized ndardized
Coemticents Coemeients g oeffmients Coeffietnts Comnts Coeeflents
-- t Sig. t Sig. t Sig.EBd. Beta B Beta B Sd. BetaF=3 E"Erro Error
constant) 2.06 0.134 15.418 0 2.638 0.145 18.211 0 1.856 0.155 12 0
.N_AGEt -0.172 0.03 -0.106 -5.823 0 -0.182 0.034 -0.092 -5.421 0 -0.082 0.036 -0.042 -2.249 0.025
N_BVt -0.153 0.012 -0.255 -13.05 0 -0.215 0.013 -0.312 -16.93 0 -0.183 0.013 -0.288 -14.31 0
.N_CGt 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.931 0.352 0.045 0.018 0.045 2.483 0.013 0.081 0.02 0.071 4.094 0
OE_t-1 0.001 0 0.067 3.988 0 *2s85E-M 0 -0.012 -0.793 0.428 0.003 0 0.168 8.405 0
OE_t 0.001 0 0.107 6.363 0 0 0 0.055 3.511 0 0.005 0.001 0.147 7.383 0
ndustrial -0.195 0.06 -0.071 -3.24 0.001 -0.272 0.066 -0.085 -4.127 0 -0.299 0.067 -0.103 -4.484 0
Jilities -0.145 0.085 -0.031 -1.718 0.086 -0.183 0.094 -0.033 -1.948 0.052 -0.181 0.098 -0.035 -1.85 0.064
nsumer 0.027 0.061 0.01 0.441 0.659 -0.036 0.068 -0.011 -0.528 0.597 -0.181 0.07 -0.059 -2.598 0.009Noncyclical I_
nsurner -0.179 0.063 -0.06 -2.831 0.005 -0.237 0.069 -0.068 -3.419 0.001 -0.218 0.07 -0.08 -3.097 0.002
:yclical
echnology -0.201 0.084 -0.046 -2.386 0.017 -0.278 0.092 -0.054 -3.036 0.002 -0.206 0.091 -0.045 -2.269 0.023
aas -0.135 0.068 -0.041 -1.982 0.048 -0.136 0.075 -0.036 -1.82 0.069 -0.101 0.076 -0.028 -1.32 0.187
iversified -0.276 0.163 -0.029 -1.691 0.091 -0.389 0.171 -0.037 -2.27 0.023 -0.333 0.185 -0.032 -1.803 0.071
nergy -0.176 0.072 -0.048 -2.447 0.014 -0.237 0.081 -0.054 -2.938 0.003 -0.22 0.085 -0.051 -2.587 0.01
orrnunications 0.059 0.071 0.016 0.832 0.406 0.039 0.081 0.009 0.486 0.627 -0.06 0.082 -0.015 -0.735 0.482
R R Adjusted R Std. Error of R R Adjusted R Std. Error of R R Adjusted R Std. E'or ofSquare Square the Estimate Square Square the Estimate Square Square the Estimate
.334 0112 0.108 0.935924 3538 0.125 0.122 1.09603 .403" 0.162 0.158 0.995889
Change fR Square Change F Change dfI R Square Change F Change dfl R Square Change F Change df1
Statistics
0.112 28.483 14 0.125 36.595 14 0.162 39.718 14
Change Statistics Durbin- Change Statistics Durbin- Change Statistics Durbin-
df2 Sig. F Watson M2 Sig. F Watson df2 Sig. F Watson
_______ Change ______ ___ ___ Change _________ Change _____
3171" 0 2.024 3589 C 0 2.015 2871" 0 1.993
Su df en Square F Sig. um df n Square F Sig. Sum e df n Square F Sig.
Regression 349.302 14 24.95 28.483 .000b 615.45 14 43.961 36.595 .000 551.49 14 39.392 39.72 .0 0 0 b
Iesidual 2777.65 3171 0.876 4311.4 3589 1.201 2847.4 2871 0.992
otal 3126.95 3185 4926.9 3603 3398.9 2885
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Table 12: Causal Relationship: Corporate Governance Score on Tobin's Q
In order to test whether changes in corporate governance lead to increase in Tobin's Q, I run regression in which I set the changes
in logs of Corporate Governance Scores from 2009 to 2010 as independent variable and changes in Tobin's Q from 2010 to 2011
as dependent variable.
R R Square Adjusted R Std. Error of gSquare the Estimate R Square F Change df1Change
.078* 0.006 0.006 0.516895918 0.006 14.969 1
Mean Std. Deviation N Change Statistics
Durbin-
ADJQ.1 - ADJQ_0 -0.012194 0.518356101 2470 df2. F Watson
_________________________  ____________Change
LNCG_10 - LNCG_09 0.1489135 0.370400388 2470 2468 0 1.999
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized
Model Coefficienits t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 0.004 0.011 0.356 0.722
LNCG_10 - LNCG_09 -0.109 0.028 -0.078 -3.869 0
95.0% Confidence CorrelationsInterval for BModel
Lower Bound Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part
(Constant) -0.018 0.026
LN_CG_10 - LNCG_09 -0.164 -0.054 -0.078 -0.078 -0.078
Table 13: Causal Relationship: Tobin's Q on Corporate Governance Score
In order to test whether the changes in Tobin's Q leads to subsequent changes in Corporate Governance Score, I run regressions
to trace the effect of changes in Tobin's Q from 2009 to 2010 on logs of changes in Corporate Governance Scores from 2010 to
2011. I set the changes in the Tobin's Q as independent variable and logs of changes in Corporate Governance Scores as
dependent variable.
Change Statistics
R R Square Adjusted R Std. Error of theSquare Estimate R Square F Change df1Change
.013" 0 0 0.303223 0 0.449 1
Mean Std. Deviation N Change Statistics
Durbin-
LNCG_11 - LNCG_10 0.04542 0.303189 2470 df2Sig. F Waton
______________ _____Change ______
ADJ._Q_10 - ADJQ_09 0.00916 0.49329 2470 2468 0.503 1.882
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized
MdlCoeffIcients t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 0.045 0.006 7.431 0
ADJ_Q_10 - ADJQ_09 0.008 0.012 0.013 0.67 0.503
95.0% Confidence Correlations
Model interval for B Correlations
Lower Bound Upper Bound Zero-order Partial Part
(Constant) 0.033 0.057
ADJQ_10 - ADJQ.09 -0.016 0.033 0.013 0.013 0.013
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3. Discussion
Through my empirical test, I confirm that there is a positive and significant relationship between
democratic governance and firm value. However, regarding the causality, I do not find strong evidence
that an improvement in corporate governance leads a subsequent increase in firm value. A possible
explanation would be information effect. When a corporation's reputation improves, the market
appreciates it. However, this price adjustment might be only one-time adjustment. Therefore it is possible
that marginal improvement after the adjustment in corporate governance hardly makes a difference in
terms of change in Tobin's Q.
My empirical study has some limitations. First, the test does not account for the effect of each
stock's inclusion in major stock market indices. ASSET4 database is comprised of stocks included in
well-known indices such as S&P 500 and MSCI World Index. The different characteristics of different
market indices might affect the characteristics of the universe, and the inclusion could lead to an increase
in institutional investor ownership. It should also be noted that several indices included in ASSET4 are
market-cap based ones. Therefore the result could include a large cap bias.
Second, the model does not incorporate the impact of economic cycle on firm value. My
empirical test examines the relationship between corporate governance and firm value and I run
regression over three years. However, three years might not be a sufficient period of time to capture the
impact of economic cycles. An empirical study over a longer period that can capture a full economic
cycle would provide a stronger conclusion.
Third, the model does not take into account the different characteristics of the countries where the
firms are incorporated. Previous research suggests that the country's legal environment affects the
characteristics of corporate governance practice and firm value (Ferreira and Matos, 2008) (AEFM). I run
regression with about 60 country dummy variables, but because of multicollinearity I did not arrive at a
useful result from the multivariate analyses.
25 SPSS automatically exclude variables that cause a significant degree of multicollinearity. In the test with country
dummies, US and Japan company data are usually excluded.
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Chapter IV: Summary and Conclusion
In this study, I review previous studies of corporate governance and the effect of institutional
investors on firm value.
Anson, White, and Ho (2003) and AEFM (2010) argue that institutional investors' active
engagement increases firm value, whereas Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996), Wahal (1996), and
Woods (1996) suggest that there is no supporting evidence that indicates a positive correlation between
the institutional investors' shareholder engagement and firm value.
Regarding the characteristics of corporate governance on firm value, GIM (2003) and Lawellen
and Metrick (2010) suggest that there is a significant positive correlation between these two, while
Anderson and Reeb (2003) argue the opposite.
From my empirical test with more recent and globally diversified samples, I confirm that there is
a positive and significant relationship between institutional investor ownership and democratic
governance. Although the test results on causality is not statistically significant, the test on causality
indicates that it is more likely that the institutional ownership leads to an improvement in corporate
governance when there is room for improvement in corporate governance practice of target companies
rather than vice versa.
From my multivariate regression analyses, I also discovered that there is a significant positive
correlation between democratic corporate governance and firm value measured by Tobin's Q. Based on
this I believe it is possible to infer that the influence of institutional investors' active engagement on firm
value is positive.
Policy suggestion for developing countries: What is Asian Style Corporate Governance?
It has been argued that corporations in Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea tend to
have dictatorship corporate governance. People who are in favor of this dictator style of governance
practice argue that concentrated corporate governance and control allows companies to contribute more to
the overall welfare of the community. This belief is closely related to the unique history of economic
development of these countries.
Many of Asian corporation's successes have been indebted to the government support from their
home countries. In order to cultivate domestic business, these governments limited import, provided
subsidies to exporters in the form of cheap government lending and guarantee, gave tax credit to
companies, sided with the corporations in dealing with labor issues, and depreciated domestic currencies
in favor of exporters.26
The general public in these countries also contributed to this process. As consumers, they chose
domestic goods to protect infant industries and accepted lower household purchasing power caused by
artificial currency depreciation. As workers, they had to accept low wages and compensations. As
2 6 According to Korea's tax law, corporations which report operating income greater than 20 billion won
(Approximately US$18 million) have to pay 22% of taxable income as corporate tax. However, in 2010, the
effective tax rate in Korea was 17.6%. This is substantially lower than Hong Kong's (24.3%) and Singapore's
(25.5%). This is largely due to Restriction ofSpecial Taxation Act. According to this law, companies can receive tax
credit for their expenditure on certain R&D, capital expenditure, and employment Since large corporations have
greater capability to spend substantial amount of money on such expenses, critics say that most of credits are now
exploited by large corporations and smaller firms pay higher tax rates than larger corporations. "Why Samsung
Electronics Receive 2 Trillion Won Tax Return?" Weekly Chosun. (2241). 21 Jan 2013. Web. 16 April 2013.
41
investors, they had to accept low dividends or capital gains on their investments to support companies'
capital expenditure. And, as tax payers, they had to pay more taxes to make up the fiscal holes caused by
corporate flailures As a result, it became quite natural for governments and the people to believe that
corporations had an obligation to contribute to the overall welfare of the economy.
As Bertrand and Schoar suggest, concentrated ownership control has also allowed the companies
to efficiently manage their relationships with the politicians and the government. In the case of Japan and
Korea, this close relationship has helped a few firms in these nations to grow very rapidly. Referring to
those firms' success, even now a majority of business practitioners in the region warn that if firms adopt
Western style democratic corporate governance without having all the preconditions that the developed
countries have, such a change will weaken the corporations' competitiveness in the global market. They
stress that having democratic corporate control will put downward pressure on corporate credit ratings
due to the uncertainty associated with corporate control, increase possibility of hostile takeovers, distort
cash flows to increase dividends and to defend incumbent controlling shareholders' control through share
buyback, undermining corporations' growth potential, and allow foreign investors to extract wealth out of
the nations.2 ' Having suffered under imperialism in early 20*h century, many people in developing
countries find these claims quite convincing.
However, theoretically these arguments seem to lack sound basis. First, a corporation's cash
flows do not decrease just because the firm is controlled by more than one investor, rather cash flows
depend more on management skills and market condition. Second, even under the democratic governance
if a firm's management successfully convinces the investors of the need to save cash for future investment,
investors tend to wait, as shareholders of Microsoft and Apple have done. Third, if the firm's
management uses cash flows to protect the control of incumbent controlling shareholders, this is a breach
of fiduciary duty to minority shareholders. If democratic corporate governance indeed distorts cash flows,
controlling shareholders and incumbent management should be subject to blame, as they are using other
investors' money to protect their own interests. Fourth, the stock market is not a zero sum game. In other
words, even if foreign investors extract cash after driving up firm value, this benefits not only themselves
but also other investors including domestic investors. If it is true that foreign investment does indeed
threatens a country's economic independence, perhaps the country most concerned would have to be the
US. Finally, some say that unlike debt holders, equity investors tend to be actively involved in business
affairs of the companies they invest in, leading the firms to adopt innovative technology and management
know-how to increase firm value. This increased firm value allows a company to successfully defend
itself from potential hostile takeover.
In Asian countries, the size of total stock market capital relative to the nation's GDP tends to be
smaller than that of other developed countries. According to the World Bank, in 2011 the stock market
sizes relative to GDP are respectively, 118.7% in the UK, 104.3% in the US, and 109.8% in Canada.
27 Daewoo, once the second largest conglomerate in Korea, went bankrupt in 1999, leaving financial liability of $80
billion. Most of these losses were shared by local financial institutions that were bailed out by the government Kim,
Woo-jung, the ex-chairman of the company was found guilty of embezzlement and accounting fraud estimated to be
between $20 billion and $40 billion. In May 2006, Kim was sentenced to serve eight and a half years in prison and
held responsible for approximately $18 billion penalty. In 2007, he was pardoned after serving 20 months injail.
Kim, Joongi. "A Forensic Study of Daewoo's Corporate Governance: Does Responsibility Solely Lie With the
Chaeol and Korea?" Northwestern Journal ofInternational Law and Business. 28.3 (29).
2 Hwang, Dong Kyu. "The Way to Prevent the Second Sovereign Case. " Weekly Korea Economic Review. 05.29. 8
August 2005. Hyundai Research Institute. 2-6.
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However, they are 60.3% in Japan, 89.1% in South Korea, 46.3% in China. Perhaps the lack of
transparency and weak legal protection for minority shareholders explains this phenomenon.2 9
Referring to the nation's future economic growth strategy facing challenges from other
developing countries with cheaper labor forces, policy makers in Asian countries often claim that these
nations must develop sophisticated service and financial industry to continue their future economic
growth. 3
0
My research suggests that investor activism is positively correlated with higher firm value.
Although my research has some limitations, it seems quite obvious that by implementing more
transparent and accountable corporate governance, companies can increase their firm value, while also
developing the nation's financial industry. The debate over dictatorship governance versus democratic
governance seems to continue like that about protectionism versus free market economy has for the last
several hundred years. My study on corporate governance does not claim to provide a conclusion to this
on-going debate, but might nonetheless provide some insights for policy makers and business
practitioners in the region.
29
"Market Capitalization of Listed Companies (% of GDP)." Standard & Poor's Global StockMarkets Factbook
and Supplemental S&P data. Web. 20 April 2013.
30 Due to technology development and specialization, companies in that region tend to focus on high value-added
products and started moving facilities outside their countries. For instance, in Korea, it has been said that 10 families
controls 80% of Korea's national GDP, but the ten largest corporations hire only 6% of the total population.
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